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THE AXIOM OF CHOICE AND MODEL-THEORETIC
STRUCTURES
J.K. TRUSS
Abstract. We discuss the connections between the failure of the axiom of
choice in set theory, and certain model-theoretic structures with enough sym-
metry.
1. Introduction
This paper develops themes from [19], where connections were described between
questions about the axiom of choice and certain structures in model theory. Some
of these ideas are also presented in [22] and [14]. The main definition will be that
two sets X and Y are equivalent, written X ≡ Y , if for any first order structure
in a finite or countable language, which can be placed on the domain X , forming
a structure X , there is a first order structure (in the same language) which can be
placed on Y to form Y, in such a way that X and Y are elementarily equivalent.
Now it is a triviality that in the presence of the axiom of choice, two sets X and Y
are equivalent in this sense if and only if they are finite of the same cardinality, or
they are both infinite, as follows easily by using the Lo¨wenheim–Skolem Theorems.
The situation however radically changes once one drops the axiom of choice. The
theme will be that in the absence of the axiom of choice, even a mere set can hide
quite a lot of (latent) structure. So, far from being more restrictive, dropping the
axiom of choice can reveal features which in the presence of being able to well-order
everything in sight become uninteresting.
To give an initial and fairly easy example from [20], a set is said to be amorphous
if it is infinite, but cannot be written as the disjoint union of two infinite sets. It was
pointed out to the author by Azriel Levy that it is possible for an amorphous set A
to have no partition into infinitely many finite sets unless all but finitely many of
them are singletons (this is called being strictly amorphous); it is also possible for
an amorphous set B to be the disjoint union of a family of 2-element sets. In the
second case one can impose a graph structure on the set in which every connected
component has size 2, but this is not possible for a strictly amorphous set. Hence
these two are not ‘equivalent’ in the sense just introduced. In other words, B can
be endowed with a structure which makes it a graph with all connected components
of size 2, but A cannot, so that A 6≡ B. Even though the graph structure is not
‘part of’ B, qua set, it is somehow still potentially present, in a ‘latent’ fashion.
In fact, the notion can be made more general, in the sense that one can con-
sider other types of structure, not necessarily first order, on a set, and then one
gets a similar definition, which may turn out to give rather different consequences.
Whatever language L one wishes to consider however, one would usually insist that
the set of formulae or sentences of L used should themselves admit a well-ordering,
which gives a way of singling out one structure from others, as being the one which
satisfies a sentence of L which is least in this well-order that the other structures do
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not satisfy. We have a limited supply of examples of this type, sufficient may be to
show that the idea could be fruitful. Specifically, in the case of Dedekind finite sets,
being those which have no countably infinite subset, we can naturally subdivide into
two cases, the first in which there is no partition of the set into a countably infinite
family, and the rest. The former is called ‘weakly Dedekind-finite’ in [21], and the
connections with ℵ0-categorical structures are explained in that paper. So there is
here a direct connection with (well studied) first order structures. For Dedekind
finite sets outside this class however, one needs to consider stronger languages, such
as first order languages with infinitely many symbols, or infinitary languages such
as Lω1,ω to gain any similar characterization.
2. Fraenkel–Mostowski models
The easiest way to form models of set theory without the axiom of choice is
to use so-called Fraenkel–Mostowski models. These were invented by Fraenkel and
Mostowski before Cohen showed how one can get models of set theory without the
axiom of choice using forcing. The disadvantage is that they work in a weaker set
theory, which we call FM, or possibly FMC (Fraenkel–Mostowski with choice) in
which the axiom of extensionality is relaxed to allow the existence of ‘atoms’, that
is, sets which are not equal to the empty set, but all the same, have no members.
The great advantage of using this method is that the arguments about groups of
permutations are more transparent, and not complicated by technicalities involving
automorphisms of the notions of forcing, names, and so on. The disadvantage is
that one may wish for out and out Zermelo–Fraenkel consistencies. In many or
most cases however, this is automatically provided by the Jech-Sochor Theorem [9]
or strengthenings due to Pincus [16], and this applies in all cases that we study
here.
The general framework for Fraenkel–Mostowski models used here is as follows.
We start with a model M for FMC in which there is a set U of atoms (and saying
that it satisfies FMC means that it fulfils all axioms of ZFC except for extensionality
which now becomes the statement that two sets not in U are equal if and only
if they have the same members). We assume given a group G of permutations
of U (lying in M), and a normal filter F of subgroups of G. This means that
F is closed under finite intersections and supersets, and also under conjugacy by
members of G. The group G induces a natural action on the whole of M by letting
g(a) = {g(b) : b ∈ a}, which is a valid definition by transfinite induction on rank,
and the setwise and pointwise stabilizers of a ∈M are written as usual and defined
by Ga = {g ∈ G : g(a) = a} and G(a) = {g ∈ G : (∀b ∈ a)(g(b) = b)} respectively.
A set is said to be symmetric if its (setwise) stabilizer lies in F, and the resulting
FM model is given by N = {x ∈ M : x ⊆ N ∧ Gx ∈ F}. Note that this is another
definition by transfinite induction, which may be alternatively expressed by saying
that all members of the transitive closure of x are symmetric. Since we are dealing
with FM models, in which extensionality is violated for the atoms, we note that
for rank 0, x can be either the ‘true’ empty set, in which case Gx = G, so this
automatically lies in N, or an atom a, which lies in N provided that Ga ∈ F. It
is usually assumed that the stabilizers of all members of U lie in F, so this is also
always true, and this ensures that U ∈ N.
Note that the closure of F under conjugacy is required to ensure that the axiom
of replacement is true in N, which relies on the fact that gGxg
−1 = Ggx. The easiest
way to ensure that this holds is to require that F is ‘generated by finite supports’,
meaning that it is the filter generated by {Ga : a ∈ U}. Thus H ∈ F if and only if
H ≥ G(A) for some finite A ⊆ U . Normality follows from gG(A)g
−1 = G(gA). More
generally, it suffices for normality that F is generated by the pointwise stabilizers
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of some family of sets which is fixed (setwise) by the action of G, as follows by the
same calculation. (For instance, one may similarly consider the filter generated by
countable supports, and so on.) In general, any A ⊆ U satisfying Gx ≥ G(A) is
called a ‘support’ of x. A key point in discussing versions of AC in N is that the
pointwise stabilizer G(x) lies in F if and only if x can be well-ordered in N. In one
direction, suppose that G(x) ∈ F, and let ≺ be any well-ordering of x in M. Then
we can see that G(x,≺) ≥ G(x), from which it follows that x can be well-ordered in
N. For if g ∈ G(x) and y ≺ z, then (y, z) ∈≺, so from gy = y and gz = z we deduce
that (gy, gz) ∈≺. Conversely, if x can be well-ordered by ≺ in N, then G(x,≺) ∈ F.
Since any automorphism of a well-ordered set is trivial, G(x,≺) fixes each member
of x, and hence G(x,≺) ≤ G(x), which implies that G(x) ∈ F. To violate AC in N,
the following property therefore suffices: no member of F fixes the whole of U .
3. Homogeneous structures
Very often, the Fraenkel–Mostowski method is applied to a structure having a
lot of symmetry, for instance A is countable and ‘homogeneous’, meaning that any
isomorphism between finitely generated substructures extends to an automorphism.
(In the relational case, ‘finitely generated’ is the same as ‘finite’, which makes things
easier to verify.) One takes the set U of atoms to be indexed by the members
of A, the group to be induced on U by the automorphism group of A, and the
filter generated by finite supports. The two most famous examples of this are
Fraenkel’s first model, in which the structure is an infinite set with just equality,
and Mostowski’s ‘ordered’ model, in which A is the ordered set of rational numbers.
In [19] (based on ideas in [17]) this is applied to a series of classical implications/non-
implications among weak versions of the axiom of choice, which were listed in Levy’s
paper [10].
The connection between (countable) homogeneous structures and amalgamation
classes was analyzed by Fra¨ısse´. A family C of structures is said to be an amalga-
mation class if (1) it has only countably many members up to isomorphism, (2) it is
closed under forming finitely generated substructures, and under isomorphisms, (3)
it has the ‘joint embedding property’ JEP: any two members can be embedded in
another member, and (4) it has the amalgamation property, that if B, C, and D are
structures in C, and embeddings p1, p2 of B into C and D respectively are given,
then there are E in the class, and embeddings p3, p4 of C, D respectively into E
such that ‘the diagram commutes’, meaning that p3p1 = p4p2. Fra¨ısse´ showed that
a class of finitely generated structures is an amalgamation class if and only if it is
equal to the ‘age’ of a countable homogeneous structure. Here the age of A is the
family of structures which are isomorphic to a finitely generated substructure of A.
We state his main theorem as follows.
Theorem 3.1. : Let C a class of finitely generated structures. Then
(i) there is a countable structure A with age equal to C if and only if C satisfies
properties (1), (2), and (3).
(ii) there is a countable homogeneous structure A with age equal to C if and only
if C satisfies satisfies properties (1), (2), (3) and (4). Furthermore, this structure
is unique up to isomorphism.
We omit the proof, but refer to [11]. Instead, we give several examples, and
explain the connection with the corresponding Fraenkel–Mostowski models in some
cases. The unique homogeneous structure described in part (ii) of the theorem is
called the Fra¨ısse´ limit of the corresponding amalgamation class.
(1) Any countably infinite set is the Fra¨ısse´ limit of the family of finite sets (with
no structure apart from equality). This gives us the first Fraenkel model (which
contains an ‘amorphous set’—see the next section).
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(2) A countable dense linear order without endpoints is the Fra¨ısse´ limit of the
class of finite linear orders. This gives the Mostowski ‘ordered’ model. Mostowski
showed that in this model, the axiom of choice is false, but any set can be linearly
ordered (the ‘ordering principle’); later Halpern [6] showed that the boolean prime
ideal theorem is also true in this model.
(3) The ‘random graph’ is the Fra¨ısse´ limit of the class of all finite graphs.
(4) The countable atomless boolean algebra is the Fra¨ısse´ limit of the class of
finite boolean algebras.
(5) The class of finite partial orders is an amalgamation class, and its Fra¨ısse´ limit
is called the generic partial order. This was used in [12] to prove the independence of
the order-extension theorem from the ordering principle; this used a Cohen model;
to obtain the same result using a Fraenkel–Mostowki model one instead considers
the Fra¨ısse´ limit of the class of finite structures of the form (X,<,≺) where < is a
partial order, and ≺ is a linear extension of <.
(6) A vector space of countable dimension over a finite field F is the Fra¨ısse´
limit of the class of finite vector spaces over F . This gives an amorphous set ‘of
projective type’ (see the next section).
(7) The Fra¨ısse´ limit of the class of finite bipartite graphs with specified partition
is the generic bipartite graph. It may be best thought of as a partial order with
two levels, i.e. in which there are no chains of length 3.
Later we remark that the Fraenkel–Mostowski construction can be performed
even for ℵ0-categorical structures, noting that any homogeneous structure over a
finite relational language is ℵ0-categorical, but not necessarily conversely. Several
of the models just mentioned (and others) are used in [14] to analyze a variety
of possible definitions of ‘finiteness’. Furthermore, Pincus [16] showed how to use
carefully constructed homogeneous models to give independences between versions
of the axiom of choice, which streamlined earlier work solving individual cases.
4. Amorphous sets and a notion of rank
A set X is said to be amorphous if it is infinite, but cannot be written as the
disjoint union of two infinite sets. Superficially one might think that there isn’t
much to be said about amorphous sets, as the name suggests (‘without form’).
However, this is far from the case, and a study of the possibilities is carried out in
[20], with at least some success. It was pointed out to the author by Wilfrid Hodges
that the definition of ‘amorphous’ is very similar to that of ‘strongly minimal’ in
model theory, see [1]. A (definable) set in a first order structure A is said to be
strongly minimal if it is not the disjoint union of two infinite definable subsets (this
is what ‘minimal’ means), even if one is allowed to pass to elementary extensions
of the given structure (this is what ‘strongly’ means, so strictly speaking, it is a
property of the formula defining the set, rather than of the set itself). This is
clearly closely related to the definition of ‘amorphous’, and since strongly minimal
sets have been so widely studied, this observation gives rise to attractive families
of amorphous sets.
The three most famous examples of strongly minimal sets are a pure set, i.e. an
infinite set with no structure on it (apart from the equality relation), a vector space
over a finite field, and the field of complex numbers. Associated with any strongly
minimal set is a geometry, and general strongly minimal sets are often described
in terms of which kind of geometry they give rise to. The geometry for a pure set
is uninteresting, and is called ‘disintegrated’. The one from a vector space is the
associated projective geometry, and this is therefore called ‘of projective type’. The
geometry arising from the complex numbers is a lot more complicated.
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There are significant differences between the theories of amorphous and strongly
minimal sets. The first is that in set theory we are not constrained by the ‘first or-
der’ requirement, and so we should instead be thinking in terms of second or higher
order definability; or more exactly, the version of definability which looks at prop-
erties invariant under the automorphism group. In view of the Ryll–Nardzewski
Theorem [8], this amounts to restricting to ℵ0-categorical strongly minimal sets, so
for instance, the most popular examples of strongly minimal sets such as the field
of complex numbers, do not feature. However, examples arising from vector spaces
over finite fields, which are ℵ0-categorical, do arise (and are referred to as having
‘projective type’).
The failure of the axiom of choice leads however to other families of examples
of amorphous sets, which have no counterpart in the model-theoretic setting, those
which are either ‘unbounded’, or ‘unbounded of projective type’. So there is a
strong interplay between the situations in set theory without choice and model
theory, which does not however give a precise correspondence; strongly minimal
sets are far richer by virtue of the non-ℵ0-categorical cases, and amorphous sets
are far richer by virtue of those of ‘unbounded’ type. If A is amorphous then we
may consider what sorts of structures may be placed on it. The simplest one is an
equivalence relation, which we analyze in terms of the possible partitions pi of A it
defines. If pi has only finitely many pieces, then it follows from A amorphous that
exactly one is infinite. Otherwise, if it has infinitely many pieces, then they must
all be finite, and furthermore, all but finitely many of them must have the same
size, which we refer to as the gauge of pi. If pi has gauge n, then the union X of
the pieces of pi having other sizes is finite, and there is another partition of gauge
n such that X has size < n. We can say that pi is in standard form. It is shown in
[20] that any two partitions of A of the same gauge have equal sizes of pieces ‘left
over’. So, for instance, it is not possible for an amorphous set A to be expressible
both as a disjoint union of pairs, and as a disjoint union of pairs together with a
singleton (it must be either ‘even’ or ‘odd’). In [20] we distinguish various cases.
The simplest is that there is a greatest value of the possible gauges of partitions of
A into finite sets. This is called being bounded amorphous.
The ‘classification’ in [20] describes an amorphous set as being bounded or un-
bounded but not of projective type, or of projective type over (finite) fields of
bounded or unbounded size. (Any amorphous set of projective type must be un-
bounded, but it is possible for the cardinalities of the underlying field to be bounded,
or not.) This is only a very rough subdivision, rather than a true classification, but
the aim is clear. If two such sets have the same classifiers, then we hope that
in favourable instances the sets will be the ‘same’. Since one can only show that
they are necessarily in bijective correspondence by use of the axiom of choice, the
best one can hope for is that they are elementarily equivalent, once an appropriate
language has been used to describe them. In other words, this is equivalence as
introduced in the introductory section.
To create positive examples, we may employ the Fraenkel–Mostowski method,
introduced above. In fact we may do this rather generally. Let A be any structure,
assumed to have a rich enough automorphism group. In most cases, this will mean
that it is ‘homogeneous’, that is, any isomorphism between finite sets must extend to
an automorphism (though ℵ0-categoricity is actually sufficient). In particular, this
will mean that its automorphism group G acts singly transitively. In the Fraenkel-
Mostowski construction, we therefore let the set of atoms be indexed by the elements
of A, and take as group of permutations the maps induced by automorphisms of
A, also written G. Finally, the filter of subgroups is generated by the pointwise
stabilizers of finite sets.
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In the amorphous case, let us consider some examples. In the first case, A is
a countably infinite set containing an equivalence relation whose classes are all of
size 2. The automorphism group is then the wreath product of the two-element
group (swapping two elements of a pair) with the infinite symmetric group (which
permutes the pairs). The structure we started with is strongly minimal, as any
infinite set definable from finitely many parameters must contain an element such
that it, and its paired element are not in the list of parameters, so it follows that
the set must contain all elements for which neither it nor its paired element is in the
list of parameters (what is needed to do this formally is to note that the stabilizer
of the set of parameters acts transitively on the set of such points).
In this model we could say that |U | is an ‘even’ number, meaning that U is a
disjoint union of pairs. As remarked above, it would then follow that |U | cannot also
be odd. However, the same model does contain ‘odd’ amorphous sets, for instance,
the one obtained by removing a point from U (or adding one), or one can construct
a model purpose built containing an odd amorphous set (though now with an ℵ0-
categorical but not homogeneous structure, being an equivalence relation in which
all classes except one have size 2, the other being a singleton).
For an amorphous set of projective type, we can start with A being a vector
space V of dimension ℵ0 over a finite field F , and G its group of automorphisms
(the general linear group). The fact that the resulting set is amorphous then follows
by an easy group-theoretical argument as before. For if X is a finite subset of U ,
the subspace generated by X is finite, and the general linear group acts transitively
on its complement. Variants of this example can produce amorphous sets actually
corresponding to the geometry, that is the set of 1-dimensional subspaces of V ; or
one can remove some points and work with what is left (with technicalities needed
to sort this out). In other words, there are lots of different options obtained from
essentially the same starting point. In all cases there will be an amorphous set of
projective type, but it may be somewhat ‘hidden’. Note that in this case, there
are partitions of U into finite sets of arbitrarily large gauge, namely the cosets
of subspaces, but there is no way of ‘combining’ these, which would provide a
countable subset and violate amorphousness.
In [20] a method is presented of ‘recovering’ the original structure from the struc-
ture in the model. A number of assumptions need to be made to make this work,
but they are not unreasonable in the context. Specifically, one starts with a model
M of FMC containing a set U of atoms, a group tailored to the particular case,
which will here be the automorphism group of a structure, either an equivalence
relation with classes of size 2, or a vector space over a finite field, and the filter
of finite supports, i.e. generated by the pointwise stabilizers of finite sets. One
then forms the corresponding FM model N, which will contain an amorphous set of
the appropriate type. Now imagine starting in N, and trying to return to M. We
assume that U is equipped with the appropriate structure, which in the cases we
have so far described is either an equivalence relation with classes all of size 2, or a
vector space over the given finite field. Once can recover the original choice model
by adjoining a generic well-ordering of U of type ω. Conditions will be finite 1–1
sequences of members of U , with the natural partial order by extension, and then if
F is an N-generic filter for this partial order, by genericity it defines a well-ordering
of U of type ω. Then one can see that the generic extension of N by F is actually
equal to the original model M.
An alternative method, which uses model theory rather than set theory, and in
some ways is more flexible, was suggested by Cherlin, and is presented in [21]. Here
one considers U together with its structure in the two cases, and one looks at the
first order theory true in U in this structure. Although U has no well-ordering
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(in N), the language used is well-orderable (actually the language is finite, but
the set of formulae is well-orderable in type ω). We need the following lemma.
We write ∆ for {x : ℵ0 6≤ x}, the class of Dedekind finite cardinals, and ∆4
for {|X | : there is no map from X onto ω}. The latter are called in [21] weakly
Dedekind finite cardinals (even though the condition they have to fulfil is actually
stronger than being Dedekind-finite).
Lemma 4.1. (i) For any cardinal number x, x ∈ ∆4 ⇔ 2x ∈ ∆.
(ii) If x, y ∈ ∆, then x+ y, xy ∈ ∆, and similarly for x, y ∈ ∆4.
Proof. (i) If X has a partition into countably many non-empty sets, then certainly
ℵ0 ≤ |P(X)| so 2x 6∈ ∆4. Conversely, suppose that An are distinct subsets of X .
For Y ⊆ ω let AY =
⋂
n∈Y An ∩
⋂
n6∈Y (X \ An). Then all the AY are pairwise
disjoint, and since An =
⋃
{AY : n ∈ Y }, and all An are distinct, infinitely many
AY must be non-empty. Let Y = {Y ∈ P(ω) : AY 6= ∅}. Then Y is an infinite
subset of P(ω). Note that for any infinite subset Z of P(ω), there is some m such
that {Z ∈ Z : m ∈ Z} and {Z ∈ Z : m 6∈ Z} are both non-empty, and one of
which must therefore be infinite. Using this, we may choose infinite subsets Yn
and mn ∈ ω by induction. Let m0 be the least such that {Y ∈ Y : m0 ∈ Y } is an
infinite proper subset of Y if any, or if not such that {Y ∈ Y : m0 6∈ Y } is an infinite
proper subset of Y, and let Y0 be whichever of these two sets has been chosen (note
that AC is not required here, since we made a choice which was definable in terms
of the data). If mn and Yn have been chosen, let mn+1 be the least m such that
{Y ∈ Yn : m ∈ Y } is an infinite proper subset of Yn if any, or if not such that
{Y ∈ Yn : m 6∈ Y } is an infinite proper subset of Yn. Note that as all members of
Yn agree about membership or not of m0, . . . ,mn, we must have mn < mn+1. This
defines an infinite strictly decreasing sequence of subsets of X , and hence there is
a map from X onto ω.
(ii) First assume that x, y ∈ ∆, and let X and Y be disjoint sets of cardinalities
x and y respectively. If f maps ω 1–1 into X ∪ Y , then either {n : f(n) ∈ X} or
{n : f(n) ∈ Y } is infinite, contrary to x, y ∈ ∆. For products, suppose that f maps
ω 1–1 into X × Y . Let f(n) = (ξn, ηn). If ξn takes infinitely many distinct values,
this gives ℵ0 ≤ x, and similarly, if ηn takes infinitely many distinct values. Since f
takes infinitely many values, one of these must apply.
Next suppose that x, y ∈ ∆4. If g maps X ∪ Y onto ω, then one of g−1(ω) ∩X
and g−1(ω) ∩ Y is infinite, contrary to x, y ∈ ∆4. For products, suppose that f
maps X × Y onto ω. If for some ξ ∈ X , the image of f on {ξ} × Y is infinite, we
would have y 6∈ ∆4. Hence each such image is a finite subset of ω. Since the finite
subsets of ω can be well-ordered in type ω, and x ∈ ∆4, only finitely many such
sets can arise, which means that f cannot be surjective after all. 
Theorem 4.2. [21] Let U be a set with no countable partition, which admits a struc-
ture axiomatizable in a finite language L. Let T be the (complete) set of sentences
of L which are true in U . Then for any n, the set of formulae with free variables
among {v0, v1, . . . , vn−1} is, up to T -equivalence, finite. Hence T is ℵ0-categorical.
Proof. For each formula ϕ of L in {v0, v1, . . . , vn−1} look at all the n-tuples of
members of U satisfying ϕ. As ϕ varies, this gives a countable family of subsets
Uϕ of U
n. Now from the fact that there is no map from U onto ω, it follows
that the same is true for Un, which implies that its power set is Dedekind finite.
Hence this family of sets is actually finite. If we say that ϕ ∼ ψ if Uϕ = Uψ, then
ϕ ∼ ψ ⇔ U |= ∀v0 . . .∀vn−1(ϕ ↔ ψ) ↔ T ⊢ ∀v0 . . . ∀vn−1(ϕ ↔ ψ), and it follows
that up to T -equivalence, there are only finitely many formulae in {v0, v1, . . . , vn−1}.
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The statement we have established is well known to be an equivalent of ℵ0-
categoricity, and the equivalence does not require the axiom of choice in its proof.

Applying this theorem, one can obtain results about the structures which certain
Dedekind-finite sets can carry, appealing to known results with AC. An example
given in [21] is that of what groups can exist on a set admitting a notion of ‘rank’,
as defined in [13]. We note that this notion has nothing to do with the usual set-
theoretic notion of rank in the cumulative hierarchy, but is rather meant to be an
analogue of Morley rank in a non-AC context. The definition is as follows. The
empty set has rank −1. If X 6= ∅, then X has rank α, where α is an ordinal, if it
does not have rank < α, and there is some positive integer k such that whenever
X is expressed as the disjoint union of k + 1 sets, at least one of them has rank
< α. The least such k which will serve is called the degree of X . Note that this is
precisely analogous to the usual definition of ‘Morley rank’, where the definability
requirements are omitted. One easily verifies that a set has rank 0 if it is non-
empty and finite (and its degree is then equal to its cardinality). It is amorphous
if and only if it has rank and degree 1. Thus ‘having rank’ is a generalization
of amorphous. One can indeed verify that any set having a rank in this sense is
weakly Dedekind-finite, as is easily proved by transfinite induction. For let α be
the least ordinal such that some set X of rank α (and degree k) is not weakly
Dedekind-finite, and let X =
⋃
n∈ωXn be an expression for X as a disjoint union
of countably many non-empty sets. Then we can write X as the disjoint union of
k + 1 sets Yi =
⋃
n∈ωXn(k+1)+i, where i ≤ k, and at least one of these must have
rank < α, giving a set of smaller rank which is not weakly Dedekind-finite, which
is a contradiction. Now we can build FM models containing sets having arbitrarily
large rank, and we can be curious as to what the structures are which are given to
us by appealing to Theorem 4.2. We outline one way to do this, which seems to
work rather more simply than the method given in [13].
A boolean algebra is said to be superatomic if all its homomorphic images are
atomic. An equivalent, and for us more useful, way of thinking of superatomic
boolean algebras is given for example in [3]. Let B be any boolean algebra, and
define an increasing sequence of ideals Iβ inductively thus. Let I0 be the ideal
generated by all atoms (where an atom is a minimal nonzero element), and assuming
that Iβ has been defined, and is a proper ideal, let Iβ+1 ⊇ Iβ be such that Iβ+1/Iβ
is the ideal of B/Iβ generated by its atoms. At limits we take unions. Then
I0 ⊆ I1 ⊆ I2 ⊆ . . . is an increasing sequence of subsets of B, so there is a least γ
such that Iγ = Iγ+1. One can verify that γ must be a successor, = β + 1 say, and
β is called the rank of B. Then as is shown in [3], B is superatomic if and only if
B/Iβ is finite. If we write its order as 2
k, then k is called the ‘degree’ of B.
It is remarked in [7] that an efficient way to view superatomic boolean algebras,
at any rate in the countable case, is via topologies on ordinals. If we consider
ordinals of the form ωα + 1, where this is the ordinal power, and we consider
successor ordinals for convenience, since then the usual ordinal topology is compact,
we consider the boolean algebra B of clopen (closed and open) subsets. (To get a
superatomic boolean algebra of rank α and degree k one instead considers ωα ·k+1.)
The operations are the usual ones of union, intersection, and complementation in
the whole set. Then we can verify that B is a superatomic boolean algebra of rank
α as follows. Notice that the atoms are precisely the singletons of the form {β}
where β < ωα is not a limit ordinal. In other words, I0 consists of the finite sets
of ordinals which are not divisible by ω. In a similar way, I1 comprises the finite
sets of ordinals which are not divisible by ω2 and so on. In general, Iβ comprises
all finite sets of ordinals which are not divisible by ωβ+1. Hence the least ordinal
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β such that B/Iβ is finite is α. Another way of viewing the same thing is to note
that the quotient algebra B/I0 corresponds to the set of limit ordinals, and the
process of forming successive quotients precisely corresponds to taking the usual
Cantor-Bendixson derivative.
We now build an FM model based on such a superatomic boolean algebra B. We
let U = {uβ : β ≤ ωα}, and we letG be the group induced on U by homeomorphisms
of X = ωα + 1 to itself. This time the filter used is the one generated by singleton
supports as well as the stabilizers of clopen sets. Notice that we have to distinguish
between atoms of the boolean algebra, and the members of U , which are ‘atoms’
as in the FM construction. The latter include also uλ for limits λ, even though
{λ} is not clopen. We now need to demonstrate the connection with MT-rank.
Here some care is needed, and this is because, for finite α, U does have rank α,
but not for infinite α, in which case we need to pass to a suitable subset. In fact,
for each λ which is 0 or a limit ordinal, Yλ = {uλ, uλ+1, uλ+2, . . .} is (strictly)
amorphous in N. First note that Yλ lies in N, since it is supported by the clopen
set {uλ+1, uλ+2, . . . , uλ+ω} and the two singletons {uλ} and {uλ+ω}. For if g ∈ G
fixes each of these 3 sets, then it also fixes the boolean combination Yλ. Now let Y
be a subset of Yλ in N, supported by H ∈ F, which contains the pointwise stabilizer
of a finite subset of U and finitely many clopen sets. Now any clopen set either
intersects Yλ in a finite set or contains all but finitely many of its members, and so
H acts transitively on a cofinite subset of Yλ. Hence Y is finite or cofinite. Similarly
we can see that for each λ which is divisible by ω2, Zλ = {uλ+γ : γ < ω2} lies in N
and has MT-rank 2, and so on. This establishes the statement about MT-rank in
the case that α is finite.
If however α ≥ ω, then U is not weakly Dedekind-finite, because for each n ∈
ω, {uγ : γ divisible by ωn but not ωn+1} lies in N with empty support, since
G preserves the topology, and these sets are definable from the topology via the
Cantor–Bendixson derivative. So in this case, U certainly does not have MT-rank.
However, if we instead consider X = {uγ : γ is not a limit ordinal}, then we do
obtain a set of MT-rank α (and degree 1) in all cases (even uncountable α). To
show this, we use transfinite induction. In fact we can show that for 0 < β < α and
γ such that ωβ · γ < ωα, X ∩ {uδ : δ < ωβ} and X ∩ {uδ : ωβ · γ < δ < ωβ(γ + 1)}
are of MT-rank β (and degree 1). First, they lie in N since {uδ : δ ≤ ωβ} and
{uδ : ωβ ·γ < δ ≤ ωβ(γ+1) are clopen and the given subsets of X differ from these
by finite sets and by the set {uλ : λ a limit}, which is fixed by G. If Y ⊆ X ∩ {uδ :
δ ≤ ωβ} lies in N, supported by a finite subset of U and finitely many clopen sets,
Y contains or is disjoint from a final segment of X ∩ {uδ : δ ≤ ωβ}, so by passing
to its complement if necessary, suppose it is disjoint. Dividing into the cases β a
successor or limit, we see that Y is contained in a finite union of sets corresponding
to a smaller value of β, so has rank < β by induction hypothesis, as required.
We conclude this section by giving some further examples of what structures
can exists on amorphous sets, or indeed on ones having MT-rank. Even in [18] it
was shown that no amorphous set can have an infinite subset which can be linearly
ordered. Generalizing from this case, one can show that the same is true for any
set having MT-rank. In fact, in [13] a precise characterization is given of which
partial orders can exist on a set having MT-rank. With regard to other kinds of
structure, such as groups, things are however rather different. We have seen that
it is possible for an amorphous set of projective type to carry a non-trivial group
structure, in fact even a vector space structure over a finite field. Groups arising
in this way are however all abelian. Any set of size at least 6 can trivially carry a
non-abelian group structure on a subset. One wonders whether this is all that can
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happen. The following theorem from [21] provides an elegant answer. A group is
said to be abelian-by-finite if it has an abelian normal subgroup of finite index.
Theorem 4.3. A group G whose underlying set has MT-rank is abelian-by-finite.
Proof. The trick here is to deduce the result from [2] where it is shown that an
ℵ0-categorical ω-stable group is abelian-by-finite. By Theorem 4.2, the theory of G
is ℵ0-categorical, so has a unique countable model, written as G∗. So what remains
is to show that G∗ is ω-stable, and that ‘abelian-by-finite’ can be expressed in
a first order way, so that it will be true also for G (since G and G∗ satisfy the
same first order sentences). Now from the existence of MT-rank on G, it follows
straightforwardly that G∗ has Morley rank (the precise argument is given in [21]),
and hence that it is ω-stable (see for instance [15] Proposition 6.46). It is also shown
in [2] that any ℵ0-categorical abelian-by-finite group has an abelian subgroup of
finite index which is definable without parameters, and hence the desired property
is first order expressible. 
5. Richer languages
Up till now we have considered first order languages with finitely many symbols,
and as we have seen this has restricted us very much to the weakly Dedekind finite
case. We may relax this in two different ways. The first and less radical, is to allow
the language to be infinite, that is, staying with a first order language, but allowing
infinitely many symbols. If we are seeking to describe all members of ∆, then we
may also wish to consider second order, or infinitary logic, for instance Lω1ω.
Let L be a first order language with infinitely many symbols, but which can still
be well-ordered. If there are infinitely many constant symbols, then these must
be interpreted in any model, so its domain A cannot possibly be Dedekind finite.
Thus the first realistically different case for us is where there are infinitely many
unary predicates Pn. By taking boolean combinations, we may suppose that these
are pairwise disjoint, and we therefore at once have infinitely many 1-types, so as
expected, the theory will not be ℵ0-categorical. For Russell’s ‘ω pairs of socks’, the
set Pn determined by each Pn has size 2, and these are required to be pairwise
disjoint. If we use this to build a Fraenkel–Mostowski model using finite supports,
then the automorphism group must fix each Pn, but it can arbitrarily interchange
its two members. Using this, we can see that the set U of atoms is Dedekind-finite
in the resulting model, but |U | 6∈ ∆4 since it keeps the countable partition. In fact,
if (X,<) is an infinite linearly ordered subset of U in N, supported by
⋃
n≤N Pn
for some N , then some member x of X lies outside this set, and the permutation g
which interchanges x and the other member y of the Pm in which x lies, and fixes
all other points, lies in the stabilizer of
⋃
n≤N Pn but does not preserve the order.
Thus U has no infinite ordered subset, and hence no infinite well-ordered subset,
so lies in ∆.
Let us contrast this example with one described in section 4, which provided
an amorphous set of gauge 2. The difference is that there the equivalence classes
were not named. So if we instead say that x ∼ y if for some m, x, y ∈ Pm, then
the automorphism group now just has to preserve the equivalence relation, so we
can permute the sets Pm for different m, and this leads to the wreath product as
stated. Model-theoretically, the difference between the two structures is that for
(A, {Pm : m ∈ ω}), definable closure is locally finite, but algebraic closure is not.
Here we recall that the algebraic closure acl(X) of a set X is the union of all the
finite sets which are definable over X (i. e. using parameters from X), whereas its
definable closure dcl(X) is the union of all the singleton sets which are definable
over X . It is clear that X ⊆ dcl(X) ⊆ acl(X). In (A, {Pm : m ∈ ω}), the definable
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closure of any X ⊆ A is the union of all the sets Pm that X intersects, whereas its
algebraic closure is the whole of A, since each Pm is a finite definable set. However,
in (A,∼), the definable closure of X is equal to its algebraic closure, and this is the
union of all Pm that X intersects.
It is well-known, and easy to check, that in an ℵ0-categorical structure, algebraic
closure is necessarily locally finite, meaning that the algebraic closure of a finite set
is finite. This means that we can use any ℵ0-categorical structure A to produce a
Fraenkel–Mostowski model in which the set of atoms is weakly amorphous, thereby
giving the reverse construction as in Theorem 4.2, and generalizing the examples
given at the end of section 3. The key point is that for any finite subset X of A
(a support), its algebraic closure is finite, and by the Ryll–Nardzewski Theorem,
the pointwise stabilizer of X has only finitely many orbits on the complement of its
algebraic closure. The examples previously given were homogeneous over a finite
relational language, and these are necessarily ℵ0-categorical, as one sees by counting
the number of n-types for each n.
To give an example of a non-homogeneous structure which is ℵ0-categorical,
consider a partially ordered set (T,<) which is a tree (or semilinear order), meaning
that it is not a linear order, any two elements have a common lower bound and
for any x ∈ T , {y ∈ T : y ≤ x} is linearly ordered. In [4], a list of ‘sufficiently
transitive’ countable trees is given (where this means that the automorphism group
acts transitively on the set of 2-element chains, and also on the set of 2-element
antichains). The simplest in Droste’s list has maximal chains isomorphic to Q, and
every vertex splits x into two ‘cones’, meaning that x is the greatest lower bound of
two incomparable elements, but that for any three pairwise incomparable elements
greater than x, there is a point above x which lies below at least two of them. This
characterization (together with countability) is sufficient to determine T uniquely
up to isomorphism, and its automorphism group is very rich. It is however not
homogeneous, as it is easy to find two 4-element antichains (pairwise incomparable
subsets) which are in distinct orbits of Aut(T ). Even in this case, we easily expand
the language to make the structure homogeneous, as is done by adding in ‘join’ as
a new operation. Although this is no longer relational, it is still locally finite, which
eases application of the Fra¨ısse´ theory. One can vary this example by considering
instead the so-called ‘weakly 2-transitive trees’ [5] (still in the countable case),
being those in which the automorphism group acts transitively just on the family
of 2-element chains. This time there are examples in which the tree has vertices
for which the number of cones varies in an infinite set. This structure is definitely
not ℵ0-categorical, so if we use it to build a Fraenkel–Mostowski model, then its
cardinality does not lie in ∆4, though one can easily check that it is still Dedekind-
finite.
In all these cases we can attempt to find to what extent the (relational) structure
A that we used when building the model is ‘detectable’ from just the set U which
results, so that the set retains some ‘hidden’ structure. The most straightforward
instance is where the domain can be written (definably) as a disjoint union of ℵ0-
categorical sets, which can each be permuted independently of the others. So by
expanding the language if necessary, we can write A as the disjoint union of sets Pn
(thought of as unary predicates), each of which will be preserved by the automor-
phism group of A (the reason we insisted that A was relational was so that subsets
would automatically give rise to induced substructures). Let N be the resulting
Fraenkel–Mostowski model. Then U is the disjoint union of the interpretations
Un of Pn. Furthermore, since Pn is assumed ℵ0-categorical, Un will be weakly
Dedekind-finite. In the cases we consider, U will be Dedekind-finite, which follows
given transitivity of Aut(A) on each Pn. In fact we can verify that definable closure
12 J.K. TRUSS
is locally finite. For let X ⊆ A be finite. Then for some n, X ⊆
⋃
i<n Pi. Since the
restriction of A to Pi is ℵ0-categorical, the algebraic closure of X ∩Pi is finite, and
hence so is its definable closure, and since Aut(A) acts transitively on each Pn, the
overall definable closure of X is finite. This means that given any finite support for
an infinite subset of U , there must be an infinite orbit (non-trivial would suffice) of
its stabilizer, so this subset cannot be well-orderable in the model. Without tran-
sitivity this would fail, since for instance, each Pi could be an infinite dense linear
ordering with endpoints, which would be ℵ0-categorical but not transitive, and the
set of left endpoints would form a countable subset. Also, if the pieces cannot be
permuted independently, the argument would also fail. For instance, if every Pi is
a copy of Q, and the group is order-preserving on each, but is required to map 0 in
each copy in the same way, then the whole of the group acts transitively on each Pi,
but the stabilizer of 0 in one copy fixes 0 in all copies, yielding a countable subset.
6. Remarks on equivalence
In this final section we return to the equivalence relation which was mentioned at
the start, and use some of the examples given to elucidate it. We recall that we say
that sets X and Y are equivalent, if for any first order language L having countably
many symbols, for any L-structure that can be put onto X , there is an elementarily
equivalent L-structure that can be put on Y . As remarked before, in the presence of
the axiom of choice, all infinite sets are equivalent. Even without choice, it will still
be the case that all infinite well-orderable sets are equivalent (by the same proof,
using Lo¨wenheim–Skolem; one needs to check that the existence of a model of ar-
bitrarily large cardinality may be proved using a standard technique, for instance
a Henkin style proof, using an effective well-ordering of the formulae involved in
terms of the originally given well-ordering of the set, and the language). Further-
more, it is obvious that If X1 ≡ Y1 and X2 ≡ Y2, and X1 ∩X2 = Y1 ∩ Y2 = ∅, then
X1 ∪X2 ≡ Y1 ∪ Y2, which means that we can immediately find enormous ≡-classes
(proper classes) of even non-well-orderable sets. One might wonder whether there
are any ‘small’ equivalence classes. Since any two sets having the same cardinality
are necessarily equivalent, any ≡-class not containing the empty set is automati-
cally a proper class, so instead we should say that an equivalence class is ‘small’ if
the set of cardinalities of its members is small.
Theorem 6.1. (i) If X is amorphous, and X ≡ Y , then Y is also amorphous.
(ii) X is Dedekind-finite, and X ≡ Y , then Y is also Dedekind-finite.
Proof. (i) Suppose for a contradiction that Y is not amorphous, and write Y as
a disjoint union Y = Y1 ∪ Y2. Let L the language {=, P} where P is a unary
predicate, interpreted in Y as Y1. Since X ≡ Y , there is an interpretation X1 in X
for P . The facts that Y1 and Y \Y1 are infinite are each expressible by an (infinite)
set of first order sentences, so it follows that X1 and X \X1 must also be infinite,
contrary to amorphousness of X .
(ii) This time we can use the language L containing = and one unary function
symbol f . If X ≡ Y where Y is not Dedekind-finite, then there is a 1–1 function
from Y to Y which is not onto, which is expressible as an L-sentence. In any
interpretation of L in X , we would have a 1–1 but not onto function, contrary to
X Dedekind-finite. 
We remark that similar results hold for most of the notions of finiteness discussed
in [14].
Even here, it doesn’t follow that the ≡-class of an amorphous set is small. In
fact, it is consistent that there is a proper class of equivalent amorphous sets of
distinct cardinalities (for instance, they could all be strictly amorphous), but it is
THE AXIOM OF CHOICE AND MODEL-THEORETIC STRUCTURES 13
also consistent that there is an amorphous set with small equivalence class. For
instance, in the Fraenkel model for a single (strictly) amorphous set, one can easily
check by a support argument that any amorphous set has cardinality which differs
from the original one by a finite number (plus or minus), so actually in this case
the equivalence class is countable.
As remarked above, all infinite well-orderable sets are equivalent, and from this
we can deduce the existence of many ‘large’ equivalence classes, based on the above
observation concerning unions. For instance, if X is an amorphous set, then the
unions of X with all infinite well-ordered sets are all equivalent, again giving a
proper class of possibilities. This idea is exploited in the following result.
Theorem 6.2. Any equivalence class of infinite sets which is a set must consist
entirely of Dedekind finite sets.
Proof. Let X lie in an equivalence class which is a set, and suppose for a contra-
diction that |X | 6∈ ∆. Then we can write as a disjoint union X = Y ∪ Z where
|Z| = ℵ0. By the Lo¨wenheim–Skolem Theorem, Z is equivalent to all infinite ordi-
nals, and hence on taking unions, X is equivalent to the union of Y with any infinite
ordinal so there is a proper class of cardinals of sets equivalent to X , contradicting
our assumption. 
This theorem explains the main emphasis in this paper on Dedekind finite sets.
It doesn’t mean however that the non-Dedekind finite case need necessarily be
uninteresting, but it is so far unexplored.
The way in which the definition of equivalence works out is clearly heavily de-
pendent upon which language or type of language we allow. We conclude with a
number of examples which illustrate some of the possibilities.
Example 6.3: Consider the ‘pairs of socks’ example from section 5. Here U =⋃
n∈ω Pn. Then U is equivalent to any union of infinitely many Pn, as any such can
be made into a model of the same set of sentences on reinterpreting the predicates
Pn. Hence the equivalence class of U has size at least 2
ℵ0 . Now consider any
X ≡ U . Then putting the structure given by the Pn on X , we deduce that there
must exist pairwise disjoint subsets Qn of X also all of size 2. It is not clear however
that X =
⋃
n∈ωQn. In ordinary first order model theory, we would definitely not
know this, as by the compactness theorem this theory has nonstandard models,
whose elements which do not lie in
⋃
n∈ω Qn all have the same 1-type. We can try
expanding the language to rule this out here by adding one more unary predicate
Q to the language to stand for X \
⋃
n∈ω Qn. Since U ≡ X , there must be an
interpretation for all the Pn and Q in U . If we could guarantee that Pn is still
interpreted by Pn, then this would at once yield a contradiction, but of course we
do not know this is the case. So it is slightly mysterious which X can arise here.
Example 6.4 The same Fraenkel-Mostowski model results if we let G be the group
of permutations of U which preserves the partial ordering given by u ≺ v if for
some m < n, u ∈ Pm and v ∈ Pn. The difference here is that we are now working
in a language with finitely many symbols. For the same reason as in the previous
example, there are at least 2ℵ0 (cardinals of) sets equivalent to U . Running through
the same discussion, let X ≡ U . Thus there must exist a partial order on X
satisfying precisely the same sentences as (U,≺) did. In particular, every element
lies in an antichain of size 2. Also there are elements on the bottom level, and the
next, and the next ... (as these can all be expressed by first order sentences), so X
begins with a copy of (U,≺), but apparently may have other elements above. Once
again, if we attempt to rule them out by introducing a new unary predicate Q for
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the ‘infinite’ elements, then it may be possible to reinterpret ≺ in U to mirror this
situation, by ordering the levels of which it comprised in a different way.
Example 6.5 We can vary the basic strictly amorphous construction at higher
cardinalities κ. Let λ and κ be infinite (well-ordered) cardinals, with λ ≤ κ. We
let U = {uα : α < κ}, G be the group of all permutations of U , and take the
filter F of subgroups of G generated by the pointwise stabilizers of subsets of U of
cardinality < λ. Then in the resulting model, U cannot be written as the disjoint
union of two non-well-orderable sets. In fact we have included λ in the description
only to illustrate a particular point, namely that there is no essential difference
between the models formed by taking λ and κ, and λ and λ. As far as the model
is concerned, a subset of U is either of cardinality < λ, or its complement is. For
instance, if λ = ω we again obtain a strictly amorphous set, which is equivalent to
the one found by also taking κ = ω. So, now assuming that λ = κ > ω, we see that
in order to ‘describe’ U , we definitely appear to require a stronger language than
just first order logic with countably many symbols. There are (at least) two main
options; one is to add a large number of symbols, probably constants in this case;
the other is to use a second order language. Adopting the second idea in the special
case where κ = ω1, we can express the main features by saying that there is an
infinite well-orderable subset, and any two infinite well-orderable subsets have the
same cardinality. We can also say that X cannot be well-ordered, but whenever it
is written as a disjoint union Y ∪Z, one of Y and Z is countable. These properties
can all be expressed in second order logic. For larger values of κ, things are more
complicated, and what can be expressed, even in second order logic, will depend to
what extent κ is definable.
Example 6.6 We can form a transfinite version of pairs of socks, in which U =⋃
α<κ Pα, where the Pα are pairwise disjoint 2-element sets. Here the group has to
fix every Pα, and the supports are taken to be subsets of U of cardinality < κ. In
this model, U has subsets of all cardinalities < κ, but not of cardinality κ itself,
though there is a surjection to κ. The situation can be described in second order
logic, depending on the value of κ, or alternatively using first order logic with
κ unary predicates Pα. Similar remarks apply about its equivalence class as in
Example 6.3.
Example 6.7 Finally we may vary the vector space example, and take U to be
indexed by a κ-dimensional vector space V over a finite field, or the rationals. The
group G is induced by the automorphism group of V (its general linear group),
and we may take F to be the filter of subgroups generated by the pointwise sta-
bilizers of countable sets. This has properties analogous to example 6.5 vis-a-vis
the amorphous case, in that any subset of U in the model is either contained in a
countable subspace, or contains the complement of such a subspace. Again a lot
can be expressed about this situation using second order logic, but exactly what
will depend on the value of κ. The natural choice of language will have, in addition
to vector addition, zero vector, and additive inverses, and a unary function symbol
signifying multiplication by each member of the field.
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